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BOOK REVIEWS__________________________________ 
 
 
 
Women, Islam and International Law: Within the Context of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. By Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko. Leiden;Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009. Pp. xi, 263. ISBN 978-90-04-17144-2. EU€ 104.00; US$ 
160.00. 
  
Women, Islam and International La: Within the Context of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women is the eighth monograph in a series dealing with international law 
issues.  Each monograph is the result of academic research mainly produced 
by professors and graduates of the Graduate Institute in Geneva.  Hence, this 
work is based on the author’s research and thesis from the Institute.  Much has 
been written on the role of women in Islam, especially, critical of nations 
whose populations are predominantly Muslim.  In this work, the criticism is in 
the context of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
It is worth noting that a scholarly critique of the treatment of women 
within any religion in the context of CEDAW can be made.  However, Islam 
seems to be a popular target of our times.  It appeals to the western audience, 
and it is still acceptable to view non-western women as exotic, discuss their 
rights or lack thereof, and suggest ways to improve their conditions with the 
implication being that they are the victims and we (in the west) can rescue and 
enlighten them, and democratize their societies.  The author acknowledges 
this view and that in the feminist literature these women are portrayed as 
“victims, influenced, unable to decide, oppressed and in need of guidance and 
help from the outside.” The author also recognizes that, “any discriminatory 
practice is not simply a religious prescription or cultural attitude or a tradition 
but rather a mixture of them.” The view that discriminatory practices stem 
from a mixture of religion, culture, and tradition is rational and compelling.  
However, the following statement takes a different turn: “However, since the 
focus of the present research is on religious and in particular on Islam based 
justifications for practices discriminatory against women, the term “Islam” is 
used in the absence of a better designation of these by Islam motivated and 
justified forces.” (P. 6, FN 13, emphasis added) Stating that these 
discriminatory practices are “Islam motivated and justified” is essentially yet 
another misinterpretation of Islam and its teachings and removes the more 
influential factors from the equation, namely, culture and tradition.  
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Furthermore, the misleading notion that there isn’t a better 
designation for these practices/forces advances Islam’s misinterpretation.  In 
fact, there are many possible designations that may be even more precise, 
patriarchy being one of them.  The countries highlighted in chapter three are 
all fundamentally patriarchal societies.  Stating that the discriminatory 
practices are “Islam motivated” in these patriarchal societies where culture 
and tradition are so ingrained and historically precede Islam is disingenuous 
and endorses stereotypes of Muslim women and Islam in particular.  The 
author acknowledges that “it is difficult to distinguish practices based on 
tradition or custom from religious practices.” However, there seems to be 
nominal effort in this work to make the distinction. As the title implies, 
tradition and custom are not what are under review here. Rather, it is Islam 
and the (mis)interpretation of Islamic teachings that are under review.  The 
author does provide a disclaimer, “It should be therefore kept in mind that 
when a reference is made in this paper to one of the three notions, it implies in 
most cases a reference to the mixed concept of ‘tradition, custom and 
religion’.  The contrary is always indicated expressly.” (P. 4, FN10) However, 
the premise that the discriminatory practices are “Islam motivated and 
justified” and that tradition and custom are removed from the analysis 
somewhat diminishes the value of this disclaimer. 
Conversely, there are some favorable qualities of this work.  The 
author does attempt to reference Muslim feminist scholarship beyond the 
bibliography but does so insufficiently.  For example, Leila Ahmed’s seminal 
work, Women and Gender in Islam, is one of many examples that argue that 
the oppressive practices to which women in the Middle East are subjected are 
due to the prevalence of patriarchal interpretations of Islam rather than Islam 
itself.  There are many other Muslim scholars who have offered different 
interpretations of Islamic teachings that are considerate of women’s rights.  
However, disappointingly, these views are not brought into the analysis as 
well; rather it is the oppressive discriminatory practices resulting from 
patriarchal interpretations leading to the reservations to CEDAW.  It may 
have been valuable to the reader to present a more complete analysis to how 
and why the reservations came about and place the reasons in their historical 
and cultural context. The author advocates that, 
there is a need for work to be done by modernist Muslims 
themselves to persuade – or better to recall to – ordinary 
Muslims that diversity of opinions, new interpretations and 
constant change are integral parts of Islamic tradition; that 
therefore, new visions of the status of women can be not only 
brought from the outside, but also generated from within the 
Islamic tradition itself. (P. 212) 
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Indeed, there is such a need in the Muslim community, and, more broadly, 
there is a universal need to acknowledge diversity of opinions and recognize 
new interpretations of women’s rights. The author does identify some 
contemporary Muslim scholars and scholarship, not so much directly in the 
discussion, but more so in the extensive bibliography and the footnotes. 
The author’s attempt to provide constructive criticism and promote 
dialogue at least in the academic realm may be, incidentally, achieved. 
Studying the reservations system to the CEDAW and the reactions of party 
states to the reservations is an interesting angle.  Furthermore, this work raises 
some central issues that can be explored in the future and, potentially, 
promote dialogue. A couple of examples include “the internal factors [of 
governments and politics in Muslim States] constituting an impediment to the 
further spread, development and acceptance of new visions of the status of 
women in Islam,” and the extent interference into the private sphere is 
necessary “to achieve de facto equality between men and women.”  
Finally, this work would have to be supplemented greatly by other varied 
scholarship in the field to truly promote an objective understanding and 
dialogue, and ultimately bring positive change through international law.  
Consequently, the comprehensive bibliography may be one of the most 
beneficial parts of this work.  Krivenko has gathered an impressive list of 
works cited and this feature adds to this book’s reference appeal.  I would 
recommend this work as a supplement to an academic library with a 
collection on international human rights. 
 
Aslihan Bulut 
Librarian for Foreign, Comparative, International Law 
Harvard Law School Library 
Cambridge, MA USA 
 
 
The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law. By Albie Sachs. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009 Pp. xiv, 306. ISBN: 978-0-19-957179-6. 
UK£21.99; US$40.00. 
 
Albie Sachs was a member of the African National Congress (ANC) 
and part of an effort to overthrow the apartheid regime in South Africa. He 
was detained, subjected to solitary confinement multiple times, and lost part 
of his vision and his arm to a car bomb. In post-apartheid South Africa, he 
served on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and was 
appointed to South Africa’s first Constitutional Court. According to the book 
jacket summary, this book provides “unique access to an insider’s perspective 
on life as a member of a modern judiciary, and a rare glimpse into the 
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workings of a judicial mind.” The summary does not prepare the reader for a 
glimpse into what seems like another world of judicial decision making that 
inspires awe, compassion, and understanding. 
This book is not an autobiography and it is not necessarily linear. 
Sachs does not describe in detail the solitary confinement, the car bomb, or 
the many other unspeakable events that he and others had to endure. These 
events are discussed, but only for the purpose of explaining the thought 
process behind a specific judgment or opinion. The phrase “insider’s 
perspective” sounds almost sinister and the summary makes the book sound 
like it could be a “tell-all” about life as a member of the South African 
judiciary. However, throughout the book Sachs is very respectful of the 
privacy of the other members of the judiciary. He does not discuss specific 
events unless they involve his thoughts or his actions.  
Each chapter of the book discusses a specific topic and includes a 
short, relevant excerpt from caselaw or other writings. Focusing on a specific 
topic allows Sachs to give details of relevant events from his past life without 
explaining them in their entirety. This works to great effect, because he is able 
to use the same event in different sections and describe it from different 
angles. If the solitary confinement, the car bomb, and the other difficulties 
were discussed in detail at the beginning of the book, the references later in 
the book would have lost their strength, or Sachs would have been forced to 
retell the stories, which would have diluted their impact. Discussing the parts 
of any important event as it relates to the topic of the chapter made each event 
stand out separately and gave the book an overall cohesion that it might have 
struggled with if they were included in great detail out of the given topical 
context.  
The best part about this book is the journey it takes the reader on. The 
first few chapters make it seem like post-apartheid South Africa is on another 
planet. The descriptions of the ideals and operation of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Constitutional Court seem unbelievable 
in the current global environment. Sachs shows the struggle that many people 
faced to forgive those that admitted to the crimes they committed under 
apartheid. He notes that the process of the TRC allowed many people to 
discover what happened to family members and friends in a way that meant 
this information was not lost forever. By the beginning of chapter three, it is 
clear that post-apartheid South Africa is simply an amazing example for 
applying justice. This feeling continues through most of the book, and it 
seems that Sachs saved some of the more realistic views and results for the 
end. Towards the end of the book he shows that judgments did not always go 
as expected or the way he would have liked. The later chapters helped to bring 
the book back down to reality, though there is no denying that South Africa 
has come a long way.   
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The final chapter discussing same sex marriage is especially relevant 
in the United States right now and the style describes the whole book 
perfectly.  Sachs discusses his thoughts and opinions on a very emotional 
topic in a calm and thoughtful manner. His writing imparts a feeling of a 
person narrating a story from a third person point of view even though his 
feelings and opinions are the focus of the story. While this may not be an 
effective method of storytelling for everyone, it works for this book. The 
narration is not void of emotion or feeling; it is organized and precise. 
Emotions can be useful when trying to convey a point, but words can 
sometimes fail to carry a complete thought when they are muddled with 
emotion. This book is written in the same way that Sachs describes writing an 
opinion. While the reader is only seeing the final draft of the story he is 
telling, the reader gets a feeling that beneath the refined narration is a flood of 
emotion. Even if this entire book is a “lie” (see Chapter 2) it is well written 
and entertaining. The style of the book makes the topic accessible to an 
audience that is much broader than the legal academy or profession.  
 
Joe Cera 
Reference Librarian 
Berkeley School of Law, Boalt Hall 
University of California 
Berkeley, CA USA 
 
 
Universities and Copyright Collecting Societies. By Dinusha Kishani 
Mendis. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009. Pp. xvii, 258. ISBN: 978-90-
6704-298-7. UK. £:38.00; US$85.00. 
 
 Copyright law in most countries provides automatic, long-lasting 
monopolies over creative works to their authors. To reduce the transaction 
costs involved in requesting, receiving, and paying for copyright permissions, 
authors have joined into collective copyright management organizations. 
These organizations provide a centralized place for users of copyrighted 
material to pay for and receive the licenses they need to legally use the 
materials. The license fees are then distributed to the publishers and authors. 
 In this book, Dinusha Kishani Mendis, a Lecturer in Law at the 
University of Central Lancashire, UK, examines the relationship between 
these copyright licensing organizations, or copyright collecting societies, and 
UK institutions of higher education. His conclusion is that while copyright 
collecting societies are an efficient mechanism for distributing copyright 
licenses, their largely monopolistic hold over the copyright permission market 
has enabled them to charge educational institutions too much while not giving 
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schools needed flexibility in their licenses. He also argues that the societies 
are not transparent in their distributions to authors, preventing authors from 
knowing if they are receiving fair remuneration for their creative work. 
Mendis proposes that the UK higher education system move to a model based 
on the Higher Education Resources On-Demand project that enables more 
flexible educational access to copyrighted materials and that academic 
publishing in journals be funded through publishing fees paid out of research 
funds. The scholarly literature would then be largely open access, with 
reproduction permissions handled through a blanket license that permits 
educational reproduction, digitization, and use in course packs. 
 Much of the book details the history of copyright and its effect on 
higher education. The first hundred pages walk the reader through the birth of 
copyright law as we know it in the Statute of Anne and how colleges and 
universities adapted to copyright as higher education dramatically expanded 
in the 1960s. Using cases from Australia, the UK, and Canada, Mendis then 
explores the factors courts consider when deciding when schools are liable for 
copyright infringement by students and staff. Mendis discusses relevant cases, 
legislation, and government reports in close detail. 
 Mendis then turns his attention to copyright collecting societies, 
explaining how obtaining copyright permissions on a case-by-case basis 
imposes prohibitive transaction costs. The need for an efficient means of 
gathering needed licenses led to the development of centralized societies that 
can take advantage of economies of scale. Mendis argues that while these 
societies have gained near monopolist control of the copyright licensing 
market in their respective countries, adding competing societies to the market 
is unlikely to save schools money because transaction costs would increase by 
dealing with multiple organizations. 
 Mendis contends that collecting societies do not adequately benefit 
the authors whose work the societies license. He offers the UK Copyright 
Licensing Agency (CLA) as an example, delving into the CLA's annual 
reports to show that the society's accounting and reporting practices make it 
difficult for authors to understand how royalty fees are collected and 
disbursed. Rather than working for the interests of educational institutions or 
scholarly authors, collecting societies seem to benefit the academic and 
corporate publishers that produce monographs and journals. 
 The penultimate chapter seems to be a digression on open access to 
scholarship, reviewing the serials crisis in libraries and more liberal copyright 
licenses. However, this final thread is tied together with Mendis's proposal 
that more scholarly publishing be made open access and paid for with 
publishing fees taken out of research funding. These proposals seem to be 
directed at government and major private research funding bodies and the UK 
2010] BOOK REVIEWS       241 
 
 
higher education consortium that negotiates blanket copyright licenses with 
the CLA. 
 The book provides a thorough history of UK copyright and higher 
education and would be a useful resource for researchers exploring these 
topics. Mendis thoroughly lays out the procedural history of legislative, 
judicial, and administrative decisions and completely documents his sources 
with footnotes. An extensive bibliography and tables of cases and legislation 
round out the volume. 
 The primary weakness of the book is that the generous use of large 
block quotes and sentences in the passive voice interrupts the text's flow and 
distracts the reader from the book's arguments. Notwithstanding this weakness 
of presentation, the book is most suitable for collections focusing on 
European and comparative copyright law. Researchers looking into European 
higher education are also likely to find material of interest. 
 
Benjamin J. Keele 
Reference Librarian 
William & Mary Law School 
Williamsburg, VA USA 
 
 
Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective.  Edited by 
Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann.  Dundee: Dundee University 
Press, 2009.  Pp. lxvi, 614.  ISBN 978-1-84586-027-1.  UK£50.00. 
  
Some books deliver less than the title promises.  Rights of Personality 
in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective delivers much more.  It amply 
covers the Scots law on personality rights and provides a comparative 
perspective on this law.  However, it also is a major work identifying, 
analyzing, and critiquing the law concerning personality rights in common 
law, civil law, and mixed jurisdictions. 
 While not unknown to legal scholars in England, the United States, 
and other countries where the common law prevails, the concept of 
“personality rights” is more familiar to the jurists of civilian and “mixed” 
legal systems.  Scotland has a mixed legal system drawing upon both common 
law and uncodified civil law.  The civil law has tended to recognize “rights” 
and then fashion a legal remedy for infringement of a right.  The common 
law, in contrast, offers a remedy only within the context of specific causes of 
action whose requirements must be satisfied.  As Niall Whitty states, 
“Personality interests do not align exactly with the delicts [torts] which 
protect those interests.” 
 The book’s initial description of “rights of personality” is that they 
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encompass the rights which protect “who a person is rather than what a person 
has.”  Whitty provides a “working” list of specific personality rights: (i) the 
right to life; (ii) the rights to bodily integrity and to personal security; (iii) the 
right to physical liberty; (iv) the right to reputation (esteem of others); (v)  the 
right to dignity in the narrow sense (self-esteem,  honor, and freedom from 
insult); (vi) the right to privacy (seclusion from intrusion); (vii) the right to 
informational privacy (non-disclosure of private information); (viii) the right 
to identity (image); (ix) the right to publicity, appropriation of image, and 
reification of rights to privacy and image; (x) the moral right to copyright; (xi) 
the right to autonomy; (xii) personality rights in family relationships; and 
(xiii) personality rights after death. 
A less expansive concept of personality rights is that they involve 
primarily rights to privacy, dignity, identity, and control over one’s creations 
and accomplishments, which fall within items (v) through (x) of this list.  It is 
these rights that the book focuses on.  There is also material on the right to 
reputation, which has been protected by liability for defamation, and 
autonomy rights (principally in the context of medical practice). 
 The book contains twelve chapters written by distinguished academic 
authors from Scotland, England, Continental Europe, and South Africa.  The 
first chapter, presented by the volume’s editors Niall Whitty and Reinhard 
Zimmermann, provides an overview that identifies rights of personality, their 
status in Scottish, English, and European law, and key issues pertaining to the 
future development of personality rights in Scotland.  These issues include 
options for the protection of personality rights and the impact of incorporation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK domestic law.  Most 
of the options discussed involve judicial development of Scots law rather than 
legislation.  Whitty and Zimmermann find a “modern need to affirm and 
protect a right of privacy.” Article 8 of the ECHR has been interpreted to 
require legal protection of privacy from intrusion by non-governmental as 
well as governmental actors.  However, it does not require any particular form 
of protection or remedy. 
 Subsequent chapters focus upon historic and present-day Scots law; 
protection of personality interests in major civilian systems of Continental 
Europe (France, Germany, and Italy); personality rights in South Africa—a 
mixed common law/civil law jurisdiction in which rights to personal dignity 
have gained recognition; English law’s protection of privacy and “publicity” 
or “image” rights; the application of intellectual property law to personality 
rights in England and other common law jurisdictions; and autonomy and 
dignity as elements of UK medical law.  One chapter presents a “database” 
comparing the structure and content of personality rights law in a number of 
common law, civil law, and mixed legal systems. 
 The two chapters presenting an essentially common law view of 
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personality rights are concerned primarily with economic interests, including 
a celebrity’s interest in controlling the exploitation of the celebrity’s fame or 
image.  There is also some consideration of interests in limiting disclosure and 
use of personal information and preventing commercial exploitation.  Hazel 
Carty discusses how these interests are protected by the tort of passing off and 
the action for breach of confidence.  David Vaver, in an especially lively 
contribution to the book, considers the extent to which intellectual property 
law, specifically the law of trade mark, copyright, moral rights and passing 
off, does or should protect individual characteristics such as one’s name, 
voice, image and persona (adopted character).  He believes that intellectual 
property’s “biggest problem for personality” is that personality interests attach 
to the person and cannot be transferred, whereas intellectual property is 
usually a “commodity” that can be transferred, bought and sold.  
 At several points in the book there are references to the four privacy 
torts that have become embedded in American law1 and the right of publicity.2  
But notably absent from the book is substantial text on protection of 
personality rights in the United States.  (An expected contribution from the 
United States was thwarted by Hurricane Katrina.)  There is much literature 
available on the American privacy torts and right of publicity and it is 
unlikely that Scots law would incorporate the specific categories of liability 
that have developed in the United States, so the absence from the book of 
substantial material on American law is not a major deficiency.  However, an 
American contribution probably would have discussed the extent to which 
freedoms of speech and press limit liability for infringement of personality 
interests and caused more to be written by other contributors on the role these 
freedoms have or should have in framing personality rights.  The legal 
doctrines presented in the book and suggestions for future development could 
not be accepted in the United States without allowing much more freedom to 
publish truthful information and original creative works.  The allocation of 
liability for invasion of privacy to four specific categories has come under 
renewed criticism.  Material in the book will be valuable to American scholars 
in supporting some of the criticism and identifying alternatives that might be 
incorporated into American law. 
 The book grew out of an international conference on personality 
rights, but it is more a collective treatise on personality rights law than a 
collection of conference papers.  As in the typical treatise, there is a table of 
cases, table of legislation, and list of secondary works cited.  The depth of 
                                                 
1 Appropriation of name or likeness, intrusion upon seclusion, publicizing a private 
matter, and false light publicity.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E 
(1977).  
2 RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-47 (1995). 
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research undertaken to write the book is indicated by the length of the tables 
and breadth of the sources cited, as well as by what is found in the footnotes 
of each chapter.  The book will be quite useful and stimulating as a basis for 
further research and writing on rights of personality, not just in Scotland but 
in many other places around the globe. 
 
Peter B. Kutner 
Hugh Roff Professor of Law 
University of Oklahoma College of Law 
Norman, OK USA 
 
 
The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and Future 
Prospects.  By Rex J. Zedalis.  Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009.  Pp. 335.  ISBN 978-0-521-76661-6.  UK£59.00; US$90.00.   
 
The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and 
Future Prospects is a thoroughly researched analysis of Iraqi energy law.  It is 
written by Professor Rex J. Zedalis from the University of Tulsa, College of 
the Law.  Prof. Zedalis has written numerous other articles and books on the 
legal issues surrounding oil and gas in the Middle East.3  His expertise is 
evident as he explains the historical and current legal situation in Iraq, and 
suggests what the future legal landscape might look like in Iraq.   
The publisher asserts in the front matter pages that Legal Dimensions 
of Oil and Gas in Iraq “is the first and only comprehensive examination of 
current and future legal principles designed to govern oil and gas activity in 
Iraq.”  This seems to be an accurate claim.  There are other books about Iraqi 
oil and gas law, but none that seem as current and as detailed  
The book is divided into three parts covering: 1) the historical 
background, 2) the current legislative framework, and 3) the future. Each of 
the three parts is divided into well-organized and clearly written chapters, and 
each chapter is self-contained with a short introduction, followed by a detailed 
analysis, and a conclusion.  It is a book that one can read from cover to cover, 
or use as a research tool by looking for specific topics or legal issues covered 
in one or two chapters. 
                                                 
3 The author also recently published the book Claims against Iraqi Oil and 
Gas: Legal Considerations and Lessons Learned.  These two books complement each 
other well and could be considered companion publications, but this review only 
covers The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and Future. 
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The goal of part one of the book is to state the relevant facts and the 
applicable law.  Thus, chapter one provides a historical overview of the facts 
about the legal status of Iraqi oil and gas and is followed in chapter two by an 
introduction to, and commentary on, the relevant Iraqi constitutional 
provisions.  
Part two is particularly useful for those seeking to understand both the 
practical and theoretical aspects of current oil and gas law in Iraq.  The 
purpose of this part of the book is to identify and analyze legislation that 
supplements the general principles of oil and gas law outlined in the Iraqi 
Constitution and to understand how these laws are manifested in oil and gas 
development agreements in Iraq.  This section describes both federal 
legislation such as the federal oil and gas framework law and regional 
implementations of legislative measures such as the Kurdistan Regional 
Government’s Oil and Gas Law.  In part two, the author also analyses the 
federal revenue sharing law, the impact of reorganizing the government’s 
Ministry of Oil, and the measures reconstituting the Iraq National Oil 
Company. 
The third part of the book deals with current legal issues and the legal 
problems that may arise in the future.  Chapters in this section are organized 
around specific legal issues such as the claims of foreign creditors after the 
expiration of the United Nations Security Council resolutions that protect 
Iraqi oil and gas from creditor nations.  This section also addresses the 
potential legal ramifications if any of the following should happen: 1) the 
framework law fails, 2) the proposed laws on revenue sharing are abandoned, 
or 3) Iraq does not effectively transition to a single autonomous nation-state.  
The book has an adequate index, but it would be more useful for legal 
research if it was a bit more detailed.  For example, the index has an entry for 
“Iraqi Constitution” listing over 120 different page numbers.  It would be 
more useful if it was broken down by constitutional article so that the reader 
could quickly find all of the pages discussing a specific section of the 
Constitution.  This is also true of index entries for other oil and gas laws. The 
index listing for “oil and gas framework law” shows over 80 different entries, 
which is good because the reader knows that the coverage is extensive, but the 
general nature of the index entry makes it hard to focus on a specific section, 
article, or annex of the law. Although a researcher could mine the extensive 
footnotes in this book to find citations to sources of law relevant to Iraqi oil 
and gas issues, the book has no formal bibliography of resources for addition 
research.  Having such a listing of resources would be useful to researchers.  
It would also be helpful if the author had included a table of relevant laws or 
at least a table showing all of the laws cited in the book.  
The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq: Current Reality and 
Future Prospects is an impressive book. It covers an evolving topic about a 
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country going through a major political transition. Anyone with a passing 
interest in Middle East energy law, or an urgent need for detailed information 
about the legal structure surrounding the oil and gas industry in Iraq, should 
consult this book. It provides an excellent starting point for anyone interested 
in the historical context, current status, or possible future of Iraqi energy law. 
Thus, it is a good choice for a college, university, or law school library.  It is 
also an excellent book for business executives, government officials, lawyers, 
and others involved with any legal issue surrounding the oil and gas industry 
in Iraq.  As the future unfolds in Iraq, the disposition of the country’s oil and 
gas reserves will be an important component in the evolution of Iraqi law, and 
the political and economic development of Iraq.  This book will serve as a 
useful guide as Iraq moves forward. 
Legal Dimensions is clearly organized and easy to read, even if one 
isn’t an expert in the field.  However, the book goes into tremendous detail 
and is heavily footnoted so that it does cover the subject in depth. 
 
Vincent Moyer & Catherine Deane 
Foreign, Comparative & International Law Department 
Hastings College of the Law Library 
San Francisco, CA USA 
 
 
The Law in Crisis: The Ecstatic Subject of Natural Disaster. By Ruth A. 
Miller. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-8047-
6256-4. Pp. 238. US$60.00. 
 
Law in Crisis is one of a handful of titles in Stanford University 
Press’s Cultural Lives of Law series. Books in the series “take up the 
challenges posed as boundaries collapse between as well as within cultures, 
and as the circulation of legal meanings becomes more fluid.” Knowing this, a 
prospective reader can safely expect a degree of confusion, which is after all 
one of the explicit themes of the series. Law in Crisis redoubles the prospect, 
for its thesis is that legal responses to disasters and other “states of exception” 
—confusing situations to begin with—establish a legal baseline, a normative 
subject of law and politics, by recourse to the emergence of “ecstatic 
subjects”—confused people on the margins, some suffering physical or 
mental injury, some barely living or already dead. Moreover, this topsy-turvy 
state of affairs in turn informs more ordinary realms of law, such as a run-of-
the-mill tort dispute. Law in Crisis is indisputably replete with collapsed 
boundaries, fluid meanings, and challenges aplenty. Unfortunately, even when 
it doesn’t simply infuriate and perplex with manifold lapses of logic and style, 
it ultimately fails as an argument. The thesis is stated and restated repeatedly 
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throughout the text, evidence is marshaled, but weakly applied, and the upshot 
is an ironically meaningless treatment of disasters and crises as cultural 
phenomena. The irony inheres in the book’s express design to instruct the 
reader about how disasters acquire meaning, whatever that means. 
 Author Ruth A. Miller is a professor of Middle Eastern History whose 
work encompasses gender and legal studies. Law in Crisis manifests her 
interdisciplinary interests. Miller culls evidence about historical disasters 
around the world from official, scholarly, and journalistic accounts in multiple 
languages. She draws on cultural and philosophical critical work produced 
largely during the late twentieth century (Giorgio Agamben, Rosi Braidotti, 
Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, et al.), including an occasional foray into 
feminist theory. Her legal analytical skills, however, are not robust. In even 
the most cursory reading of a famous ruling by then Judge Cardozo, 
Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital,4 it is plain to see that the 
outcome of the case, turning on the inapplicability of respondeat superior to 
charity hospitals such as the defendant, would not have been any different had 
the fact or origin of the plaintiff’s nervous condition been left out of the 
record. Yet Miller implies otherwise, arguing that Mrs. Schloendorff’s 
condition resulted from her having survived the 1906 San Francisco 
earthquake (a disaster), that medical and legal authorities two years later 
perceived her as hysterical (and therefore ecstatic), and that the law thus saw 
fit to immunize the hospital from liability for battery when doctors removed 
her uterus without her consent. Miller’s attempt to explain her unorthodox 
treatment of the law in a book purportedly about the law gives little 
satisfaction:  
Although the cases, statutes, codes, and regulations that 
compose the legal doctrine of disaster play a significant part 
in my argument, I pay equal attention to the literary and 
cultural discourse of disaster law—and deliberately ignore the 
boundaries that are thought to exist between legal texts with 
legal meaning and cultural texts with cultural meaning. (P. 
25) 
In fact, primary sources for the “legal doctrine of disaster” (a misnomer, but 
the intention seems fairly clear) are by no means given attention equal to that 
shone on non-legal sources. Despite her effort to characterize legal and 
cultural meanings as fungible, most of the discussion is of a vaguely cultural 
or philosophical variety. Her claim that her “working definition of disaster 
law is simultaneously legal, cultural, political, and literary production of the 
subject in crisis” serves only to justify the refusal to police borders between 
those species of discourse. (As will be seen, Miller is not averse to resolving 
                                                 
4 211 N.Y. 125 (1914). 
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either/or problems she poses with a convenient both/and.) Consequently, for 
Miller a conclusion about the cultural or political aspects of an event is ipso 
facto a legal conclusion. This would not per se be an illegitimate corollary to 
her thesis, but Miller fails to demonstrate how it is so. Instead, and apropos of 
the mission of Cultural Lives of Law, she simply “ignore[s] the boundaries 
that are thought to exist.” 
 The book commences with a first chapter introduction of salient terms 
and themes: ecstasy, subjectivity, disaster, post-Cartesian epistemology. 
Miller defines these and other critical terms by erring on the side of 
inclusiveness. Thus, ecstasy depicts all manner of outsiders and injured 
people, not merely those who manifest an affect of rapture or frenzy. This 
looseness of definition permits her to identify ecstatic subjects where none 
exist. If corpses themselves exhibit ecstasy, as she holds, then virtually 
anything, let alone anybody, could be an ecstatic subject. Further troubles 
arise in the second chapter, which examines the rhetoric of historical and 
recent writings about disaster, particularly in terms of metaphors they 
commonly invoke, two important ones for Miller being centrality (of locations 
where disasters occur) and coherence (of the rational subject), figures that 
turn out to represent to Miller a “specious rationality that in the past has led so 
frequently to the demolition or coercive re-creation of political identities.” In 
chapter 2, Miller introduces her own recurrent metaphorical theme, that of 
endowment (of meaning), here used in one of the many restatements of the 
book’s thesis: “I analyze the ways in which, historically, various earthquakes 
have been endowed with meaning, and I make the case that a disaster’s 
political meaning has been determined via the production and invocation of 
the subject in ecstasy.” In dutiful scholarly fashion, Miller routinely 
telegraphs when she is about to “make the case that” such-and-such is the 
case, yet too often it goes unmade. A subject in ecstasy is produced or 
invoked, a political meaning is asserted. The reader must take Miller’s word 
that one is a significant concomitant of the other. Similarly, Miller never 
specifies what it means to endow a disaster with meaning. Meaning requires 
context. Yet having deliberately dispensed with the boundaries that define 
contexts, Miller can’t then simply proclaim meanings floating free of any 
contexts (or, conversely, meanings situated equally among all contexts).  
 A variation of this circular argument that tries to have it both ways 
occurs in this second chapter, but also throughout the book, when Miller 
makes claims about the intelligibility of disasters: “What I suggest . . . is thus, 
first, that politics and disaster are far too entangled to address separately, and 
second, that both disasters and the political structures that develop out of them 
become intelligible only via reference to the ecstatic, eccentric subject.” 
Leaving aside the obviously falsifiable first premise—disasters and the 
politics of disaster are widely addressed separately and intelligibly so, even 
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though one will of course have implications for the other—it is simply not 
sufficient to proclaim that a disaster has become intelligible in order to make 
it so. The intelligibility she proclaims ostensibly only arises “via reference to 
the ecstatic, eccentric subject.” Hence, there is a disaster and a coincidental 
reference to such a subject in an account of the disaster. That simply is what it 
means for a disaster to be intelligible or meaningful. QED, but your mileage 
may vary. 
 The third, fourth, and fifth chapters focus respectively on body parts 
and fluids, corpses and the bodies of the near dead, and public sites of 
emergency and its aftermath, primarily camps and cemeteries. Given the 
book’s horrific subject, such lurid topics are not out of place, but Miller’s 
relentless invocation of them seems gratuitous at times. These chapters plumb 
the historical literature for case studies of disasters, yet inevitably resort to the 
same sorts of fallacious, question-begging ipse dixits illustrated from the 
second chapter. For example, in a passage in chapter 3, Miller states that 
“capital punishment . . . is nothing more nor less than an ordinary, everyday 
manifestation of disaster law . . .”. By the conclusion of chapter 5, she regards 
capital punishment as “the most apparently extraordinary law.” How does she 
achieve this radical revision? She explains that “[t]he catastrophic and the 
ordinary are not discrete arenas, and once we acknowledge their continuity, 
we must also acknowledge the impossibility of pinpointing the distinct 
moment of transition from one to the other.” But the purpose of the book had 
never been to embark on a solution to the Sorites paradox, to note precisely 
the “distinct moment” when one additional grain of sand turns a mere 
assortment into a heap. Instead, the both/and solution dissolves the either/or 
dilemma. 
 Other examples suggest Miller has a propensity to paraphrase 
unfaithfully, even exaggerate, the work of others to propel her argument. 
Again in the conclusion to chapter 5, during a discussion of how public spaces 
and ceremonies “produce” political subjects, she quotes a contemporary 
journalistic account of the San Francisco earthquake. The journalist, James 
Russell Wilson, wrote that “‘weddings in great number resulted from the 
disaster. Women, driven out of their homes and left destitute, appealed to the 
men to whom they were engaged, and immediately marriages were effected.’” 
(P.170)5 Miller takes Wilson to be stating that “it was precisely that most 
disquieting of public/private ceremonies, the wedding, that characterized San 
Francisco’s postearthquake squares and plazas . . .”. (P.171) But the text she 
quotes from Wilson makes no such claims. In an endnote to this discussion, 
Miller compounds the misreading. There she remarks that “Bataille . . . argues 
                                                 
5 Quoting James Russell Wislon, San Francisco’s Horror of Earthquake and Fire 
(New York: G.W. Bertron, 1906) 194. 
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that transgression ‘persists at the very basis of marriage,’ that the marriage 
ceremony is in fact no different from the blood sacrifice: ‘laws that allow an 
infringement and consider it legal are paradoxical. Hence, just as killing is 
simultaneously forbidden and performed in sacrificial ritual, so the initial 
sexual act constituting marriage is a permitted violation’.” (P. 218, n.127)6 
Given Miller’s evident scholarly fascination for the ghoulish, Bataille’s 
relegation to a solitary note is remarkable. But the use to which she puts his 
excerpted words is unfortunate. Plainly, Bataille is not describing the liminal 
status of marriage ceremonies, but that of “the initial sexual act constituting 
marriage.” Yet this association of marriage with blood sacrifice serves to 
bolster Miller’s attribution to Wilson respecting the “disquieting” aspect of 
weddings.  
 To be fair, Miller did not exactly set out to produce a purely logical 
argument. Rather, she seems to want to propose a suggestion about a vaguely 
symbiotic relationship between marginalized people and official or cultural 
responses to disastrous events, something to the effect that beneath the 
appearance of ordinary, mundane, bureaucratic procedures triggered in an 
emergency resides a reality consisting of extraordinary, exceptional, 
“ecstatic” phenomena. Put another way, she seems to want to demonstrate that 
rationality, as represented by such political icons as the modern liberal subject 
or stable, orderly public monuments, is in fact always vulnerable to the 
irrational, the disorderly, unpredictable propensities of people and states. She 
tries to show that the two modes somehow depend on each other and, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, that a state’s basis for legal or political action is in fact 
bound up with the irrational more so than its complement. If her point is 
simply that despite our pretensions we can never exercise a pure rationality, 
that the unpredictable lurks around every corner, even in the most mundane 
circumstances, then it is an unremarkable one. But her incessant and brooding 
intonation of her thesis betrays Miller’s subscription to a blunt Foucauldian 
naïveté, a notion that law or power operates insidiously and everywhere, 
especially where darkness and decay proliferate. 
 Stylistically, Miller too often improperly uses common, seemingly 
innocuous phrases deployed in ordinary scholarly argument that import the 
force of logic or clarity even when none is apparent, “that is” being a signal 
instance in this exemplary sentence: “Disease, that is, proves the existence of 
an earthquake even if there is no other indication that an earthquake actually 
happened.” (P. 75) Miller is here relating a position she either ascribes to or 
extrapolates from Noah Webster. In the preceding paragraph, she had made a 
similar ascription: “According to Webster, ‘considerable plague’ is . . . always 
                                                 
6 Quoting Georges Bataille, Tears of Eros (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1989) 
109-10. 
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the result of ‘convulsions of the earth’ . . .”. (P .75)7 But the passage in which 
she quotes Webster states that “it is indeed difficult to find ‘an instance of a 
considerable plague, in any country . . . which has not been immediately 
preceded or accompanied with convulsions of the earth’” (P. 74)8 Difficulty 
finding a “considerable” outbreak of disease unconnected to earthquake does 
not even suggest, let alone establish, the inevitability of their direct 
coincidence. If her point has been to illustrate how a medical or marginally 
legal discourse surrounding disease and earthquakes has associated the two to 
an extent that goes beyond merely noting their frequent coincidence, then 
Webster doesn’t serve as a suitable illustration. She cannot reasonably 
conclude, as she does, that Webster stands for the proposition that “[w]hat we 
have here, in other words, is a situation in which if there is considerable 
plague in a certain region or among a certain population, there must also have 
been an earthquake that prompted the disease . . .”. (P. 75) Yet with a coyly 
placed “that is,” she dispenses with Webster’s (and his reviewer’s) text and 
substitutes her own implausible generalization as “proof.”9 
                                                 
7 Purportedly quoting Noah Webster, “A Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential 
Diseases,” 3 The Medical Repository of Original Essays and Intelligence (1800) 278, 
283. It bears mentioning that the publication to which Miller cites was not composed 
by Webster. It is, rather, a review in a medical journal of a book published by 
Webster in 1799. Miller attributes to Webster a blockquote reproduced on p.74 of 
Law in Crisis, but these are the words of the unidentified reviewer. Later, the 
reviewer reproduces a long excerpt of Webster’s own words, some of which Miller 
also quotes and attributes to Webster (e.g., the reference to “considerable plague”).  
8 Quoting Webster [sic], p.283. 
9 Miller fails to mention that the second sentence following the reference to 
“considerable plague” in Webster’s text excerpted in the review reads, “It does not 
happen that every place where pestilence prevails is shaken; but during the progress 
of the diseases which I denominate pestilence, and which run, in certain periods, over 
large portions of the globe, some parts of the earth, and especially those which 
abound most with subterranean fire, are violently agitated.” (Webster [sic], P. 283) 
Nor does she point out the reviewer’s own concluding remarks respecting Webster’s 
analysis: 
 
We have no hesitation to admit, that the frequent coincidence of 
these great phenomena, as stated by Mr. Webster, is a most 
interesting fact in the order of nature. Enough has been observed to 
stimulate inquiry to the utmost; and it is to be hoped, that incessant 
attention will be directed to this object, until our discoveries 
concerning it become more satisfactory and complete. We may, 
however, be permitted to remark, that it is requisite to know much 
more of nature before we can hope to ascertain the precise degree of 
connection or dependence of these occurrences upon one another; 
whether they stand in the relation of cause and effect, or whether 
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 Other similarly misused common phrases include, predominantly, 
“therefore,”  “thus,” and “in other words” (as in the foregoing Webster 
example). The text abounds with these superficially scholarly indicia of 
transitional stages of an argument, phrases that could charitably be read as 
serving only to mark a paraphrase or qualify an inference. Misapplied 
adverbs, such as “arguably” and “precisely”—the former a symptom of 
waffling, the latter a device for striking emphasis often overused in so-called 
critical writing of the late twentieth century—serve a like effect, as do 
frequent passive constructions (“endowed with meaning” being the mode). 
These usages tend to mask the absence of a thought process that operates 
according to some more rigorous principle than free association or mistaking 
correlation with causation. 
 Miller’s concluding chapter reads like a last ditch attempt to 
synthesize and culminate themes from the foregoing chapters, to compose 
ideas that resolve the lingering questions about what it means for disasters to 
have meaning endowed by ecstatic subjects who have been produced by the 
intervention of a law pertaining to disasters. At the same time, it serves as an 
apologia for the failure to do so. “[T]he violence does not disappear. But a 
new vocabulary for addressing it does become possible.” (P.182) A “new 
vocabulary” is for Miller a source of “optimism” (P.178) respecting at least 
two sorts of violence: the historical violence resulting from natural disasters 
or other states of exception, and also a metaphorical violence conveyed by the 
“indefinable and unbounded” (p.182) ecstatic subject, whose shattered being 
reflects, all for the good, an irreparable rift cleaving the metaphysical plane. 
Miller’s optimism is either misplaced or cynical, for it “in no way . . . sees in 
the future some end to political violence . . .” (p.178); instead, it celebrates 
subjects in ecstasy—victims of disasters and of government mismanagement 
of disaster response—because they “have unique access to political truth and 
reality” and they “insist on being heard.” (P.178) It is difficult not to read 
these assertions as euphemisms, polite ways of affording respect to people 
who heretofore have populated page after page as cadavers or diseased and 
dismembered bodies on the brink of death, depicted in terms of the lowliest 
abjection. 
 At the outset of the book, Miller alluded to feminist theory, but then 
for the most part ignores it, despite her claim that she “both implicitly and 
explicitly relied on the insights and methodologies provided by feminist 
theory throughout this book.” (P.179) This is a dubious claim, and the absence 
                                                                                                                    
they may all be considered as effects of a common cause. (Webster 
[sic],  P. 287) 
 
Is it unfair to suggest that Miller’s scholarship here is at best sloppy? 
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of more explicit reliance on feminist theory is perhaps regrettable. Many of 
the anecdotes marshaled as historical evidence in the book’s chapters could 
indeed have been examined productively by a critique grounded in 
dimensions of gender. (She levels one in her account of Mrs. Schloendorff’s 
case, an easy target, but even then misses the opportunity to highlight 
Cardozo’s condescending dismissal of the nursing profession in his 
opinion.10) In her conclusion, she attempts to salvage feminism for her thesis, 
reciting a cento of sundry theorists whose work has associations with 
feminism and gender theory, and noting their not implausible similarities with 
her ideas about disasters and ecstatic subjects. She might also have noted that 
the source of her optimism, the shattered subjects’ purportedly unique access 
to truth and their insistence on being heard, resonates with a tried and true, 
early and ubiquitous second wave feminist goal to “give voice to communities 
that remain on the margins” (here as it’s currently expressed on the blog 
Feminist Review, evidently not connected to the longstanding interdisciplinary 
journal of the same name). Although this may attest to Miller’s feminist 
pedigree, it is by now a fairly worn, not to mention more than a little 
condescending, tribute to the women nominally intended to benefit from the 
cause. 
It is not too cynical to acknowledge that a kind of skillful misreading 
is a paradigm of scholarly argument and persuasion, particularly in the 
humanities, where one goal is to trigger a reader’s reflex emotional responses. 
Indeed, an important component of preparation to be an effective lawyer was 
once a rigorous training in the rhetorical arts, a discipline focused on 
oratorical skills and the persuasive utility of the strengths and weaknesses of 
language, both its capacity for emphatic expressiveness and its unsettling 
ambiguities. Readers can appreciate in argument an artful deployment of 
language as well as a lucid logic, and some are even willing to tolerate a 
slightly obscure logic for the sake of relishing an especially marvelous 
passage of eloquence. But where neither is in the offing, the reader is 
stranded. Although its topic is provocative—an account of moments when the 
bizarre and eccentric upstage the mundane and tedious incidentals of law 
could be rewarding—and despite the varied texts comprising its historical 
apparatus, both the logical and the rhetorical wherewithal of Law in Crisis are 
                                                 
10 “There may be cases where a patient ought not to be advised of a contemplated 
operation until shortly before the appointed hour. To discuss such a subject at 
midnight might cause needless and even harmful agitation. About such matters a 
nurse is not qualified to judge. She is drilled to habits of strict obedience. She is 
accustomed to rely unquestioningly upon the judgment of her superiors. No woman 
occupying such a position would reasonably infer from the plaintiff's words that it 
was the purpose of the surgeons to operate whether the plaintiff forbade it or not.” 
Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 134. 
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slight. Its misreadings seem more willful than skillful, and the reader is not 
likely to find its stylistic tics suitable compensation for its circumventions of 
logic. 
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In Judicial Review in EU Law, Alexander H. Türk endeavors to 
provide a "more balanced picture" than that of his colleagues.  He argues at 
the outset that other academics have been reactionary in their descriptions of a 
European Court of Justice that wants to bar as many private individuals from 
its halls as possible.  This initially haughty tone fades as Türk largely delivers 
on his promise of balance and explores different avenues to judicial review in 
the European Union's legal system.   
Judicial Review in EU Law makes clear for the reader the most 
important cases on this subject area and their effects.  Its detailed approach 
makes it a worthwhile, if daunting, resource for understanding the role of 
courts in European Union law. The book’s biggest drawback is that its 
analysis dates from August 2008.  It is a product of a pre-Lisbon Treaty era, 
and the vestigial terminology might confuse a reader unfamiliar with these 
aspects of European Union history.   
The book is divided into chapters covering the different paths and 
implications of judicial review, a helpful organizational scheme.  As Türk 
explains, judicial review in the European Union has most often occurred 
under Article 230 and Article 232 of the EC Treaty.  Article 230 gave rise to 
actions for annulment of Community acts, and discussion of this area covers 
roughly half of Judicial Review in EU Law.  The different types of reviewable 
acts are outlined in detail, and Türk goes into great depth on the treatment of 
privileged, semi-privileged, and non-privileged applicants.  Less time is spent 
on the consequences of illegality under Article 231 and Article 233, as well as 
the timing requirements of Article 230(5).   
There is also a briefer study of actions for “failure to act” under 
Article 232.  Türk goes into the ramifications of the requirement of “legal 
effects” for Article 232 actions, including special results for non-adoption of 
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preparatory acts.  He also discusses incidental review, an option for non-
privileged private parties under Articles 234 and 241 of the EC Treaty.  Türk 
describes incidental review as an even greater uphill battle, though one much 
simplified after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.     
The final two sections of Judicial Review in EU Law focus on non-
contractual liability and interim relief.  Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty sets 
out liability for acts attributable to European Community (now European 
Union) institutions.  Türk references the relevant cases covering both the tests 
for liability of the institution and assignment of joint liability to the institution 
and any member state.  Interim relief during the process of judicial review 
was made available under Articles 242 and 243 of the EC Treaty (now 
Articles 278 and 279 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union).  Article 242 allowed for the temporary suspension of an act’s 
enforcement during review, and Article 243 allowed for new temporary 
measures to be taken until review was completed.  Türk sketches out the 
requirements and procedures for these two options for interim relief.   
Judicial Review in EU Law suffers from being written (but not 
published) before the Lisbon Treaty took effect.  Changes as basic as 
nomenclature and as important as the structure of the court system rendered 
the book’s content somewhat dated even before its publication.  Anticipating 
this problem, Türk examines the Lisbon Treaty in each section and suggests 
what changes could come to pass after it.  Actions for annulment might 
feature more private parties as plaintiffs, but Türk remains skeptical of too 
much progress in this area.  He asserts any standing liberalization would be 
“modest,” but also explains some of the ways the pillar structure’s removal in 
the proposed Constitutional Treaty (and eventual Lisbon Treaty) would add 
several new areas of reviewable acts.  Türk also argues that grants of interim 
relief and actions for failure to act will remain largely unchanged.   
By the conclusion of Judicial Review in EU Law the reader has gained not 
only a thorough understanding of the case law on the subject but also an idea 
as to what changes may come to pass now that the Lisbon Treaty has been 
adopted.  While a more current update on the topic might be even more 
useful, this book is valuable enough for any international law collection. 
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